Abstract. We describe a sound method for automatically proving Hoare triples for loop-free code in Separation Logic, for certain preconditions and postconditions (symbolic heaps). The method uses a form of symbolic execution, a decidable proof theory for symbolic heaps, and extraction of frame axioms from incomplete proofs. This is a precursor to the use of the logic in automatic specification checking, program analysis, and model checking.
Introduction
Separation Logic has provided an approach to reasoning about programs with pointers that often leads to simpler specifications and program proofs than previous formalisms [8] . This paper is part of a project attempting to transfer the simplicity of the by-hand proofs to a fully automatic setting.
We describe a method for proving Hoare triples for loop-free code, by a form of symbolic execution, for certain (restricted) preconditions and postconditions. It not our intention here to try to show that the method is useful, just to say what it is, and establish its soundness. This is a necessary precursor to further possible developments on using Separation Logic in:
-Automatic Specification Checking, where one takes an annotated program (with preconditions, postconditions and loop invariants) and chops it into triples for loop-free code in the usual way; -Program Analysis, where one uses fixed-point calculations to remove or reduce the need for annotations; and -Software Model Checking.
The algorithms described here are in fact part an experimental tool of the first variety, Smallfoot. Smallfoot itself is described separately in a companion paper [2] ; here we confine ourselves to the technical problems lying at its core. Of course, program analysis and model checking raise further problems -especially, the structure of our "abstract" domain and the right choice of widening operators [3] -and further work is under way on these.
There are three main issues that we consider. where the precondition is updated in-place, in a way that mirrors the imperative update of the actual heap that occurs during program execution. The separating conjunction, * , short-circuits the need for a global alias check in this axiom. A * x →[f : y] says that the heap can be partitioned into a single cell x, that points to (has contents) a record with y in its f field, and the rest of the heap, where A holds. We know that A will continue to hold in the rest of the heap if we update x, because x is not in A's part of the heap.
There are two restrictions on assertions which make the symbolic execution view tenable. First, we restrict to a format of the form B ∧ S where B is a pure boolean formula and S is a * -combination of heap predicates. We think of these assertions as "symbolic heaps"; the format makes the analogy with the in-place aspect of concrete heaps apparent. Second, the preconditions and postconditions do not describe the detailed contents of data structures, but rather describe shapes (in roughly the sense of the term used in shape analysis). Beyond the basic primitives of Separation Logic Smallfoot at this point includes several hardwired shape predicates: for singly-and doubly-linked lists, for xor-linked lists, and for trees. Here we describe our results for singly-linked lists and trees only.
2. How to discharge entailments A B between symbolic heaps. We give a decidable proof theory for the assertions in our language.
One key issue is how to account for entailments that would normally require induction. To see the issue, consider a program for appending two lists. When you get to the end of the first list you link it up to the second. At this point to prove the program requires showing an entailment ls(x, t) * t →[n: y] * ls(y, nil) ls(x, nil)
where we have a list segment from x to t, a single node t, and a further segment (the second list) from y up to nil. The entailment itself does not follow at once from simple unwinding of an inductive definition of list segments. In the metatheory it is proven by induction, and in our proof theory it will be handled using rules that are consequences of induction but that are themselves non-inductive in character.
In [1] we showed decidability of a fragment of the assertion language of this paper, concentrating on list segments. Here we give a new proof procedure, which appears to be less fragile in the face of extension than the model-theoretic procedure of [1] . Additionally, and crucially, it supports inference of frame axioms.
3. Inference of Frame Axioms. Separation Logic allows specifications to be kept small because of it avoids the need to state frame axioms, which describe the portions of heap not altered by a command [7] . To see the issue, suppose you have a specification tree(p) DispTree(p) emp} for disposing a tree, which just says that if you have a tree (and nothing else) and you dispose it, then there is nothing left. When verifying a recursive procedure for disposing a tree there will be recursive calls for disposing subtrees. The problem is that, generally, a precondition at a call site will not match that for the procedure because there will be extra heap around. For example, at the site of a call DispTree(i) to dispose the left subtree we might have a root pointer p and the right subtree j as well as the left subtree -p →[l: i, r: j] * tree(i) * tree(j)} -while the precondition for the overall procedure specification expects only a single tree.
Separation Logic has a proof rule, the Frame Rule, which allows us to resolve this mismatch. It allows us the first step in the inference:
To automatically generate proof steps like this we need some way to infer frame axioms, the leftover parts (in this case p →[l: i, r: j] * tree(j)). Sometimes, this leftover part can be found by simple pattern matching, but often not. In this paper we describe a novel method of extracting frame axioms from incomplete proofs in our proof theory for entailments. A failed proof can identify the "leftover" part which, were you to add it in, would complete the proof, and we show how this can furnish us with a sound choice of frame axiom. The notion of symbolic execution presented in this paper is, in a general sense, similar in spirit to what one obtains in Shape Analysis or PALE [10, 6] . However, there are nontrivial differences in the specifics. In particular, we have been unsuccessful in attempts to compositionally translate Separation Logic into either PALE's assertion language or into a shape analysis; the difficulty lies in treating the separating conjunction connective. And this is the key to employing the frame rule, which is responsible for Separation Logic's small specifications of procedures. So it seems sensible to attempt to describe symbolic execution for Separation Logic directly, in its own terms. (Of course, once this is done we hope that detailed comparisons and even Nelson-Oppen style coroutining of proof methods will then be possible.)
Symbolic Heaps
The concrete heap models assume:
-A fixed finite collection Fields; -Disjoint sets Loc of locations, Val of non-addressable values, with nil ∈ Val.
We then set:
Heaps
Stacks def = Var → Val ∪ Loc As a language for talking about these models we consider certain pure (heap independent) and spatial (heap dependent) assertions.
x, y, . . . ∈ Var variables
The pure part here is oriented to stating facts about pointer programs, where we will use equality with nil to indicate a situation where we do not have a pointer. Other subsets of boolean logic could be considered in other situations. In this heap model a location maps to a record of values. The formula E →[ρ] can mention any number of fields in ρ, and the values of the remaining fields are implicitly existentially quantified. This allows us to write specifications which do not mention fields whose values we do not care about.
The semantics is given by a forcing relation s, h A where s ∈ Stacks, h ∈ Heaps, and A is a pure assertion, spatial assertion, or symbolic heap.
iff s, h Π and s, h Σ Note that we abbreviate ¬(E 1 =E 2 ) as E 1 =E 2 and true Σ as Σ, and use ≡ to denote "syntactic" equality of formulae, which are considered up to symmetry of =, permutations across ∧ and * , e.g., Π ∧ P ∧ P ≡ Π ∧ P ∧ P , involutivity of negation, and unit laws for true and emp. We use notation treating formulae as sets of simple formulae, e.g., writing P ∈ Π for Π ≡ P ∧ Π for some Π .
To reason about pointer programs one typically needs predicates that describe inductive properties of the heap. We describe two of the predicates (adding to the simple spatial formulae) that we have experimented with in Smallfoot.
Trees
We describe a model of binary trees where each internal node has fields l, r for the left and right subtrees. The empty tree is given by nil. What we require is that tree(E) is the least predicate satisfying:
∨ (∃x, y. E →[l: x, r: y] * tree(x) * tree(y)) where x and y are fresh. The use of the * between E →[l: x, r: y] and the two subtrees ensures that there are no cycles, and the * between the subtrees ensures that there is no sharing; it is not a DAG.
The way that the record notation works allows this definition to apply to any heap model that contains at least l and r fields. In case there are further fields, say a field d for the data component of a node, the definition is independent of what the specific values are in those fields.
Our description of this predicate is not entirely formal, because we do not have existential quantification, disjunction, or recursive definitions in our fragment. However, what we are doing is defining a new simple spatial formula (extending syntactic category S above), and we are free to do that in the metatheory. A longer-winded way to view this, as a semantic definition, is to say that it is the least predicate such that s, h tree(E) holds if and only if 1. s, h E = nil ∧ emp, or 2. there are x , y where
Of course, we would have to prove (in the metatheory) that the least definition exists, but that is not difficult.
List Segments
We will work with linked lists that use field n for the next element. The predicate for linked list segments is the least satisfying the following specification:
Once again, this definition allows for additional fields, such as a head field, but the ls predicate is insensitive to the values of these other fields.
With this definition a complete linked list is one that satisfies ls(E, nil). Complete linked lists, or trees for that matter, are much simpler than segments. But the segments are sometimes needed when reasoning in the middle of a list, particularly for iterative programs. (Similar remarks would apply to tree segments.)
Symbolic Execution
In this section we give rules for triples of the form
where C is a loop-free program. The commands C are given by the grammar:
The rules in this section appeal to entailments Π Σ Π Σ between symbolic heaps. Semantically, entailment is defined by:
For the presentation of rules in this section we will regard semantic entailment as an oracle. Soundness of symbolic execution just requires an approximation.
Operational Rules
The operational rules use the following notation for record expressions:
The fresh variable returned in the lookup case corresponds to the idea that if a record expression does not give a value for a particular field then we do not care what it is. These definitions do not result in conditionals being inserted into record expressions; they do not depend on the values of variables or the heap. The operational rules are shown in Table 1 . One way to understand these rules is by appeal to operational intuition. For instance, reading bottom-up, from conclusion to premise, the Mutate rule says:
, updating E in place, and then continue with C.
Likewise, the Dispose rule says to dispose a symbolic cell (a → fact), the New rule says to allocate, and the Lookup rule to read. The substitutions of fresh variables are used to keep track of (facts about) previous values of variables.
The role of fresh variables can be understood in terms of standard considerations on Floyd-Hoare logic. Recall that in Floyd's assignment axiom 
the fresh variable x is used to record (at least the existence of) a previous value for x. Our fragment here is quantifier-free, but we can still use the same general idea as in the Floyd axiom, as long as we have an overall postcondition and a continuation of the assignment command.
This rule works in standard Hoare logic: the fact that the Floyd axiom expresses the strongest postcondition translates into the soundness and completeness of this rule. All of the rules mentioning fresh variables are obtained in this way from axioms of Separation Logic. This (standard) trick allows us to use a quantifierfree language. We will not explicitly give the semantics of commands, but just say that we assume Separation Logic's "fault-avoiding" semantics of triples in: Theorem 1. All of the operational rules are sound (preserving validity), and all except for Dispose are complete (preserving invalidity).
To see the incompleteness of the Dispose rule consider:
This is a true triple, but if we apply the Dispose and Empty rules upwards we will be left with an entailment y →[] x =y y →[] that is false. The rule loses the implied information that x and y are unequal from the precondition. Although we can construct artificial examples like this that fool the rule, none of the naturally-occurring examples that we have tried in Smallfoot have suffered from it. The reason, so it seems, is required that inequalities tend to be indicated in boolean conditions in programs, in either while loops or conditionals.
This incompleteness could be dealt with if we were instead to use the backwardsrunning weakest preconditions of Separation Logic [4] . Unfortunately, there is no existing automatic theorem prover which can deal with the form of these assertions (which use quantification and the separating implication − − * ). If there were such a prover, we would be eager consumers of it.
Rearrangement Rules
The operational rules are not sufficient on their own, because some of them expect their preconditions to be in particular forms. For instance, in
the Mutate rule cannot fire (be applied upwards), because the precondition has to explicitly have x →[ρ] for some ρ.
Symbolic execution has a separate rearrangement phase, which attempts to put the precondition in the proper form for an operational rule to fire. For instance, in the example just given we can observe that the precondition x=y
, which is in a form that allows the Mutate rule to fire.
We use notation for atomic commands that access heap cell E:
The basic rearrangement rule simply makes use of equalities to recognize that a dereferencing step is possible.
For trees and list segments we have rules that expose → facts by unrolling their inductive definitions, when we have enough information to conclude that the tree or the list is nonempty.
3 A nonempty tree is one that is not nil.
Unroll Tree(E)
{Π Σ * E →[l: x , r: y ] * tree(x ) * tree(y )} A(E) ; C {Π Σ } {Π Σ * tree(F )} A(E) ; C {Π Σ } † when Π Σ * tree(F ) F =nil ∧ F =E and x , y fresh † Here, we have placed the "side condition", which is necessary for the rule to apply, below it, for space reasons. Besides unrolling the tree definition some matching is included using the equality F =E.
To unroll a list segment we need to know that the beginning and ending points are different, which implies that it is nonempty.
These rearrangement rules are very deterministic, and are not complete on their own. The reason is that it is possible for an assertion to imply that a cell is allocated, without knowing which * -conjunct it necessarily lies in. For example, the assertion y =z ls(x, y) * ls(x, z) contains a "spooky disjunction": it implies that one of the two list segments is nonempty, so that x =y ∨ x =z, but we do not know which. To deal with this in the rearrangement phase we rely on a procedure for exorcising these spooky disjunctions. In essence, exor(Π Σ, E) is a collection of assertions obtained by doing enough case analysis (adding equalities and inequalities to Π) so that the location of E within a * -conjunct is determined. This makes the rearrangement rules complete.
We omit a formal definition of exor for space reasons. It is mentioned in the symbolic execution algorithm below, where exor(g, E) is obtained from triple g by applying exor to the precondition.
Symbolic Execution Algorithm
The symbolic execution algorithm works by proof-search using the operational and rearrangement rules. Rearrangement is controlled to ensure termination.
To describe symbolic execution we presume an oracle oracle(Π Σ Π Σ ) for deciding entailments. We also use that we can express consistency of a symbolic heap, and allocatedness, using entailments:
We also use pre(g) to denote the precondition in a Hoare triple g. incon and pre are used to check the precondition for inconsistency in the first step of the symbolic execution algorithm and allocd is used int he second-last line.
Definition 2. E is active in g if g is of the form {Π Σ} A(E) ; C {Π Σ } Algorithm 3 (Symbolic Execution) Given a triple g, determines whether or not it is provable. if Switch(E), Unroll List Segment(E), or Unroll Tree(E) applies let p be the premise in return check(p) elseif allocd(pre(g), E) return {check(g ) | g ∈ exor(g, E)} else return "false" Theorem 4. The Symbolic Execution algorithm terminates, and returns "true" iff there is a proof of the input judgment using the operational and rearrangement rules, where we view each use of an entailment in the symbolic execution rules as a call to the oracle.
Proof Rules for Entailments
The entailment Π Σ Π Σ was treated as an oracle in the description of symbolic execution. We now describe a proof theory for entailment.
The rules come in two groups. The first, the normalization rules, get rid of equalities as soon as possible so that the forthcoming rules can be formulated using simple pattern matching (i.e., we can use E →F rather than E →F plus E =E derivable), make derivable inequalities explicit, perform case analysis using a form of excluded middle, and recognize inconsistency. The second group of rules, the subtraction rules, work by explicating and then removing facts from the right-hand side of an entailment, with the eventual aim of reducing to the axiom Π emp true emp.
Before giving the rules, we introduce some notation. We write op(E) as an abbreviation for E →[ρ], ls(E, E ), or tree(E). The guard G(op(E)) is defined by:
The proof rules are given in Table 1 . Except for G(op 1 (E 1 )), G(op 2 (E 2 )) ∈ Π, the side-conditions are not needed for soundness, but ensure termination.
Theorem 5 (Soundness and Completeness). Any provable entailment is valid, and any valid entailment is provable.
(The proof of completeness appears in Section A.3.)
The side-conditions are sufficient to ensure that progress is made when applying rules upwards. (The measure appears in Section A.1.) Decidability then follows using the naive proof procedure which tries all possibilities, backtracking when necessary. 
Theorem 6 (Decidability). Entailment is decidable.
It is possible, however, to do much better than the naive procedure. For example, one narrowing of the search space is a phase distinction between normalization and subtraction rules: Any subtraction rule can be commuted above any normalization rule. Further commutations are possible for special classes of assertion, and these are used in Smallfoot. This system's proof rules can be viewed as coming from certain implications, and are arranged as rules just to avoid the explicit use of the cut rule in proof search. For instance, the fourth normalization rule comes from the implications:
the fifth from the implications:
and the last two from the implications:
For the inductive predicates, these implications are consequences of unrolling the inductive definition in the metatheory. But note that we do not unroll predicates, instead case analysis via excluded middle takes one judgment to several. Likewise, the subtraction rules for the inductive predicates are obtained from the implications:
The first four are straightforward, while the last four express properties whose verification of soundness would use inductive proofs in the metatheory. The resulting rules do not, however, require a search for inductive premises.
In essence, what we generally do is, for each considered inductive predicate, add a collection of rules that are consequences of induction, but that can be formulated in a way that preserves the proof theory's terminating nature.
In the last subtraction rule, the G(op(E 3 )) ∧ op(E 3 ) part of the left-hand side ensures that E 3 does not occur within the segments from E 1 to E 2 or from E 2 to E 3 . This is necessary for appending list segments, since they are required to be acyclic.
Here is an example proof, of the entailment mentioned in the Introduction: Going upwards, this applies the normalization rule which introduces t =nil, then the subtraction rule for nil-terminated list segments, the subtraction rule for nonempty list segments, and finally * -Introduction (the basic subtraction rule for * , which appears fourth) twice.
Incomplete Proofs and Frame Axioms
Typically, at a call site to a procedure the symbolic heap will be larger than that required by the procedure's precondition. This is the case in the DispTree example where, for example, the symbolic heap at one of the recursive call sites is p →[l: i, r: j] * tree(i) * tree(j), where that expected by the procedure specification of DispTree(i) is just tree(i). We show how to use the proof theory from the previous section to infer frame axioms. In more detail the (spatial) part of the problem is, Given: two symbolic heaps, Π Σ (the heap at the call site), and Π 1 Σ 1 (the procedure precondition) To Find: a spatial predicate Σ F , the "spatial frame axiom", satisfying the entailment
Our strategy is to search for a proof of the judgment Π Σ Π 1 Σ 1 , and if this search, going upwards, halts at Π Σ F true emp then Σ F is a sound choice as a frame axiom. We give a few examples to show how this mechanism works. First, and most trivially, let us consider the DispTree example:
Assertion at Call Site : p →[l: i, r: j] * tree(i) * tree(j) Procedure Precondition : tree(i)
Then an instance of * -Introduction p →[l: i, r: j] * tree(j) emp p →[l: i, r: j] * tree(i) * tree(j) tree(i) immediately furnishes the correct frame axiom: p →[l: i, r: j] * tree(j).
For an example that requires a little bit more logic, consider:
Assertion at Call Site :
Here, the inequality x =y is added to the left-hand side in the normalization phase, and then it is removed from the right-hand side in the subtraction phase.
On the other hand, consider what happens in a wrong example:
In this case we get stuck at an earlier point because we cannot remove the equality x=y from the right-hand side in the subtraction phase. To correctly get a frame axiom we have to obtain true in the pure part of the right-hand side; we do not do so in this case, and we rightly do not find a frame axiom. The proof-theoretic justification for this method is the following.
Theorem 7. Suppose that we have an incomplete proof (a proof that doesn't use axioms):
Then there is a complete proof (without premises, using an axiomatic rule at the top) of:
(A proof sketch appears in Section A.2.) This justifies an extension to the symbolic execution algorithm. In brief, we extend the syntax of loop-free triples with a jsr instruction
annotated with a precondition and a postcondition. In Smallfoot this is is generated when an annotated program is chopped into straightline Hoare triples. The appropriate operational rule is:
When we encounter a jsr command during symbolic execution we run the proof theory from the previous section upwards with goal Π Σ Π 1 Σ 1 . If it terminates with Π Σ F true emp then we tack Σ F onto the postcondition Σ 2 , and we continue execution with C. Else we report an error.
The description here is simplified. Theorem 7 only considers incomplete proofs with single assumptions, but it is possible to generalize the treatment of frame inference to proofs with multiple assumptions (which leads to several frames being checked in symbolic execution). Also, we have only discussed the spatial part of the frame, neglecting modifies clauses for stack variables. A pure frame must also be discovered, but that is comparatively easy.
Conclusion
We believe that symbolic execution with Separation Logic has some promise for modular verification and analysis. PALE is (purposely) unsound in its treatment of frame axioms for procedures [6] , the "modular soundness" of ESC is subtle but probably not definitive [5] , and interprocedural shape analysis is just beginning to become modular [9] . But there is much more to be done on our part, even apart from investigating fixed-point convergence and widening. We would like to have a general scheme of inductive definitions rather than using hardwired predicates. (We are not just asking for semantically well-defined recursive predicates, e.g., as developed in [11] , but would want a, hopefully terminating, proof theory.) It would be desirable to incorporate our proof theory with other decision procedures, such as based on monadic second-order logic or shape analysis or Pressburger arithmetic. And so on. So clearly, this is but a start.
applies. The only case requiring care is the substitution rule for equality. Suppose that the bottom step of the incomplete proof is:
Now either x occurs in E, that is E is x, or, since upwards application of the rules only introduces fresh variables, we can assume without loss of generality that x does not occur in Σ F . In either case, Σ F ≡ Σ F [E/x], and the last step in the complete proof is then:
A.3 Proof of Completeness for Theorem 5
Applying the normalization rules eventually produces a judgment whose lefthand side is in normal form:
Definition 9 (Normal Form). Π Σ is in (subtraction) normal form if:
Lemma 10. If Π Σ is in normal form and x =E / ∈ Π, then Π[E/x] Σ[E/x] is in normal form. Proof All but the last clause of the definition of normal form are invariant under substitution, and the antecedent precludes a substitution from violating the last clause.
Definition 11. Given Σ, define Σ as follows:
Lemma 12. If Π Σ is in NF then Π Σ is in NF, and Π Σ Σ is valid.
Observe that invalidity of Π Σ Σ implies invalidity of Π Σ Σ . Normal forms are semantically consistent:
Definition 13 (Bad Model). The bad model for Π Σ in NF is obtained by assigning a distinct non-nil value to each variable, and, for each ρ, by mapping to nil all the fields which are not mentioned. We write Π Σ Σ in NF as an abbreviation to indicate the entailment Π Σ Σ assuming that Π Σ is in normal form.
Lemma 17. All the subtraction rules except * -Introduction are iff. * -Introduction is also iff when the conclusion is of the form Π Σ Σ in NF.
Proof Clearly E 1 =E 3 / ∈ Π by stuckness. Therefore Lemma 10 implies that
is in NF and obviously it is invalid. Then also Π E 1 →[n: E 2 , ρ] * Σ ls(E 1 , E 3 ) is invalid since the substitution is equivalent to strengthening Π to Π ∧ E 1 =E 3 .
Proposition 20. If Π Σ Σ in NF is stuck, then it is invalid.
Proof By induction on the number of inequalities (using fv(Π, Σ, Σ )) missing from Π.
If Σ ≡ ls(E 1 , E 3 ) * Σ we proceed by cases: 
and Π ∧ E 1 =E 3 Σ 2 Σ are derivable. Now there are two cases:
1. Π Σ 2 Σ is not derivable. Then derivability depends on E 1 =E 3 , so it is easy to see that either op(E 1 ) ∈ Σ 2 or op(E 3 ) ∈ Σ 2 . The former would imply E 1 =E 1 ∈ Π, and the latter would imply E 1 =E 3 ∈ Π. Since both contradict the assumptions, this case is not possible. 
Then the bad model of Π E 1 →[n:
If Σ ≡ tree(E) * Σ we proceed by cases: Lemma 22. If Π Σ ls(E 1 , E 3 ) * Σ in NF is stuck for all the subtraction rules except at most * -Introduction, and ls(E 1 , E 3 ) / ∈ Σ, then Π Σ ls(E 1 , E 3 ) * Σ is invalid.
Proof Assume that Π Σ ls(E 1 , E 3 ) * Σ is derivable, otherwise the conclusion follows immediately from Proposition 21. Then Σ ≡ op(E 1 ) * Σ 0 and op(E 1 ) ≡ E 1 →[n: E 2 , ρ] and E 1 =E 3 ∈ Π. Since Π Σ ls(E 1 , E 3 ) * Σ is stuck (except * -Introduction), it must be that op(E 1 ) ≡ ls(E 1 , E 2 ) and E 3 is a variable and op (E 3 ) / ∈ Σ 0 . Now since Π ls(E 1 , E 2 ) * Σ 0 ls(E 1 , E 3 ) * Σ is derivable, Lemma 15 implies Σ 0 ≡ Σ 1 * Σ 2 with Π ls(E 1 , E 2 ) * Σ 1 ls(E 1 , E 3 ) and Π Σ 2 Σ derivable.
Clearly Π ∧ Π 1 E 1 →[n: E 3 ] * E 3 →[n: E 2 ] * Σ 1 ls(E 1 , E 3 ) is invalid (the bad model is a counter-model) where Π 1 contains enough inequalities to make Π ∧ Π 1 E 1 →[n: E 3 ] * E 3 →[n: E 2 ] * Σ 1 * Σ 2 a NF (this is possible since op (E 3 ) ∈ Σ 1 * Σ 2 ).
By soundness Π Σ 2 Σ is valid, therefore Lemma 16 implies that Π ∧ Π 1 E 1 →[n: E 3 ] * E 3 →[n: E 2 ] * Σ 1 * Σ 2 ls(E 1 , E 3 ) * Σ is invalid. Since Π ∧ Π 1 E 1 →[n: E 3 ] * E 3 →[n: E 2 ] * Σ 1 * Σ 2 ls(E 1 , E 2 ) * Σ 1 * Σ 2 is valid we conclude that Π ls(E 1 , E 2 ) * Σ 1 * Σ 2 ls(E 1 , E 3 ) * Σ is invalid.
Theorem 23. If Π Σ Σ in NF is stuck for all the subtraction rules except at most * -Introduction, and * -Introduction does not prove Σ Σ , then Π Σ Σ is invalid. Proof Assume that Π Σ Σ is derivable, otherwise the conclusion follows immediately from Proposition 21. Then Σ ≡ op(E) * Σ and * -Introduction cannot eliminate op(E). We proceed by case analysis on op(E).
-Σ ≡ ls(E 1 , E 3 ) * Σ .
Then ls(E 1 , E 3 ) / ∈ Σ and Lemma 22 concludes. -Σ ≡ tree(E) * Σ .
Then E →[l: E 1 , r: E 2 , ρ] / ∈ Σ. Since tree(E) / ∈ Σ, we also have that E →[l: E 1 , r: E 2 , ρ] / ∈ Σ, therefore Π Σ tree(E) * Σ cannot be derivable, and this case is impossible.
Then op (E) ∈ Σ and op (E) E →[ρ] is derivable using * -Introduction.
Since op (E) E →[ρ] is not derivable using * -Introduction, there are two cases:
• Σ ≡ ls(E, E ) * Σ 0 and E →[n: The following theorem shows that a proof procedure which applies subtraction rules, in any order provided that * -Introduction is applied last, and without backtracking, is complete.
Theorem 24. If there is an incomplete proof in NF
without using * -Introduction, and Π Σ 2 Σ is stuck for any subtraction rule except at most * -Introduction, and * -Introduction does not prove Σ 2 Σ , then Π Σ 1 Σ is invalid. Proof Since Π Σ 2 Σ is invalid by Theorem 23, the conclusion follows directly from Lemma 17.
Corollary 25. The proof theory is complete.
